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Abstract:  NASA can more effectively perform its missions by transferring its aeronautic 
responsibilities to the Federal Aviation Administration and be renamed the National Space 
Administration (NSA).  The U.S. also must recognize that space is an emerging arena of 
international competition and conflict and militarily protect its space assets from China which 
seeks to use space to restrict the U.S.’ ability to defend its strategic interests in regions such as 
the Western Pacific. 
Enhancing Space Flight Program Efficiency 
    This brief document seeks to address how NASA can become a more effective organization in 
administering its human spaceflight programs and dealing with the increasing international 
security implications of space demonstrated by China’s increasingly assertive use of space to 
fulfill its national interests. 
     A key recommendation we make for enhancing NASA’s effectiveness is transferring its 
aeronautical programs, with a proposed FY 2014 budget requesting $565.7 million from 
Congress, to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [1].  Although aeronautical research has 
been part of NASA’s mission since the 1915 establishment of its predecessor agency, the 
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), NASA’s historical development and 
evolution have made it difficult for it to concentrate fully on space exploration where it has the 
highest public recognition.  Consequently, to emphasize its exclusive concentration on space 
exploration, NASA should be renamed the National Space Administration (NSA). NASA is also 
an example of an agency whose direction has been heavily influenced by congressional 
earmarking which has resulted in the creation of 18 facilities in Washington, DC and other 
locales across the U.S.  While this may have benefitted a variety of regional economies and the 
reelections of congressional appropriators, it has not been conducive to efficient operation and 
management.  We favor reducing the number of NASA facilities by 50% (as selected by this 
committee or a blue-ribbon commission representing relevant stakeholders) to enhance its 
managerial and operational effectiveness while recognizing this proposal will encounter 
significant opposition from congressional representatives from districts and states with NASA 
facilities targeted for closure [2]. 
 
Recognizing Space as an Arena of Geopolitical Competition 
     The primary emphasis of our assessment is on space’s increasing importance as an arena of 
international competition and conflict.  Much of public and intergovernmental discussions of 
space policy take a naively utopian view of space being an arena for peaceful international 
cooperation, but the stark reality is that space is another arena of international political and 
military competition.  This was recognized by Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr in 1984 who 
informed Congress “…while some might view that space can be kept a weapons-free sanctuary 
free of military systems, history tells us that each time new technological opportunities present 
themselves, nations invariably employ them to avoid being placed in an inferior defense 
position” [3]. 
     Consequently, any U.S. efforts in human spaceflight need to recognize the importance of 
providing effective military protection for U.S. and allied civilian and military personnel in space 
against potentially hostile attacks from Chinese or Russian forces and to protect U.S. 
communications,  intelligence, military, and space science assets against such attacks.  A 
historically close relationship has existed between NASA and the U.S. military since NASA’s 
1958 statutory creation.  This relationship must continue and strengthen in the future to ensure 
that U.S. and allied human space science collaboration is not threatened by hostile forces[4] 
     During 2012 China conducted 18 space launches and expanded its space-based intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, meteorological, navigation , and communication satellite assets 
while also developing a multifaceted program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the 
use of space-based assets by opponents during times of crisis or hostilities.   Beijing also 
continues developing the Long March 5 rocket to lift heavy payloads in space and launched 11 
remote sensing satellites with civilian and military capabilities.  These fit into larger Chinese 
anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) efforts to restrict U.S. and allied military efforts to deter 
potential Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific up to 1,000 nautical miles from China’s 
coast as part of the U.S.’ emerging AirSea Battle Plan strategy as part of its increasing strategic 
emphasis on the Asia-Pacific [5]. 
 
Chinese Military Space Aspirations 
      People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military specialists regard being able to use space and 
denying enemies access to space as integral components of modern information warfare in their 
writings.  China destroyed a defunct weather satellite in January 2007 and PLA writings 
emphasize it is essential to destroy, damage, and interfere with enemy reconnaissance, 
communication, early warning, and navigation satellites to prevent precision guided munitions 
from being used against China.  The Defense Department also asserts that most Chinese missile 
programs, including those covering ballistic and cruise missiles, are comparable to international 
competitors and that China has engaged in active espionage efforts to acquire export controlled 
technologies with aerospace capabilities used by U.S. and allied militaries [6]. 
     China’s 2011 Space White Paper considers a human mission to the moon as a possible 
objective, seeks to develop new launch vehicles, a launch site, and deploy various new satellites.  
Chinese military writings also stress commanding and controlling space to maintain the strategic 
initiative and limiting enemy use of aerospace systems to adversely impact the full spectrum of 
their combat operations.  PLA writings also stress space offensive operations including attacking 
space-related targets in orbit and on the ground.  They also stress that camouflage and stealth 
measures must be incorporated into their space systems to conceal them from opposing 
observation and probing while also being hardened against countermeasures such as dazzling and 
interference.  These factors make it highly unlikely the U.S. and China will be able to reach a 
modus vivendi on space security, that space control is essential for the U.S. to meet its Western 
Pacific security obligations, and that the U.S. must be prepared to operate in a degraded space 
environment considering its acute space dependence and have liberal rules of engagement to 
counter such threats to its space access [7]. 
     Rep. J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, recently 
observed: 
       “The reality is this:  Over the past decade, China has been developing military capabilities 
        designed to deny the United States access to the waters and airspace of the western     
        Pacific.  Through the acquisition of anti-ship ballistic missiles designed to target American 
        aircraft carriers, advanced aircraft capable of hitting U.S. and allied bases around the 
        region, and large numbers of modern submarines, Beijing has clearly signaled its intention 
        to subvert the balance of power that has anchored peace in Asia for six decades, and to do 
        so in ways inimical to American interests.  
This is not simply the case of a rising power seeking a military befitting its economic might; 
rather, China has specifically geared its military development to perceived American 
weaknesses with the objective of restricting U.S. action in East Asia.” [8] 
 
Conclusion 
    Therefore, it is incumbent on any determination of the future of the United States’ human 
spaceflight program to recognize the critical importance of space control against hostile actions 
directed at civilian scientific and intelligence and military assets for future: 
1. U.S. and allied economic advancement 
2. U.S. and allied scientific and technological advancement 
3. U.S. and allied geopolitical and national security advancement. 
  The U.S. cannot naively assume that other countries share its idealistic aspirations for space and 
must adjust its policies accordingly and seek to control space at least out to lunar orbit to ensure 
the strategic preeminence of democratic countries in this arena of international competition.  
Taking a vigilant national and international security stance on space exploration and assertively 
protecting space science assets increases the possibility that the U.S. and other countries will 
benefit economically and scientifically from space research advances in subsequent decades 
without making them unnecessarily vulnerable to threats posed by China or other countries[9].                                                        
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